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Abstract
Despite numerous public opinion polls indicating that California voters would de-
feat Proposition 8, a proposed constitutional amendment to limit marriage to one 
man and one woman, Election Day 2008 brought an end to six months of marriage 
equality for same-sex couples.  This paper explores four possible explanations for 
why Californians passed Proposition 8 despite the polls: (1) poll respondents did 
not respond honestly to pollsters; (2) some respondents who opposed same-sex 
marriage were initially reluctant to amend the constitution for this purpose; (3) the 
campaign over the amendment changed people’s opinions about same-sex mar-
riage; and (4) poll respondents did not initially understand how to accurately con-
nect their position on same-sex marriage with the “right” position on Proposition 8, 
but that they gained such knowledge over time.  This study finds minimal support 
for the first three explanations and weak support for the final explanation.
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The Polls and Proposition 8:  
Why Did Californians Reject Same-Sex Marriage?
Three May 2011 polls show Minnesotans split over a constitutional ban on 
same-sex marriage (SSM), which Republican state legislators have placed on the 
November 2012 ballot. Across the three polls, opposition ranges from 40% to 55% 
and support varies between 46% and 51% (Stassen-Berger 2011; Hauser 2011; 
Public Policy Polling 2011). Thus, Minnesota could become the first state in which 
a popular vote defeats a “clean” anti-SSM constitutional amendment (one that does 
not also ban other legal recognition of same-sex relationships).1 Many marriage 
equality supporters expected California to gain that honor in 2008, when a series of 
polls indicated that voters would defeat Proposition 8, a similar clean amendment. 
When Proposition 8 nonetheless passed 52-48, it not only shocked SSM supporters 
but raised doubts about whether polls could be trusted and whether voters in any 
state would approve SSM. The political landscape has changed dramatically since, 
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and Proposition 8 no longer looks as important as it did at the time. Legislatures in 
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and the District of Columbia have passed SSM 
laws, and legislatures in Connecticut and Iowa chose not to challenge court deci-
sions that ordered their states to stop denying marriage rights to same-sex couples. 
Legislatures in New York and Rhode Island have come close to passing SSM; and 
Hawaii, Illinois, Washington, and Nevada have joined California, New Jersey, and 
Oregon in passing broad legal recognition of same-sex relationships. Public support 
for SSM has risen substantially in the past two years: a handful of national polls 
since August 2010 shows that majorities now support SSM. These polls have not 
been put to the test, however, and support varies widely by state (Lax and Phillips 
2009; Lewis and Oh 2008). Although Washington voters upheld their “everything 
but marriage” domestic partnership law in 2009 by a 53-47 margin (La Corte 2009), 
Maine voters vetoed that state’s SSM law by the same margin in the same year. 
California offers an excellent case for studying public opinion in state battles 
over SSM. It is large and important enough that we were able to obtain individual-
level data from 24 polls of state residents since 1985, including several polls con-
ducted during the Proposition 8 campaign. We use these data to test four hypotheses 
for why Californians passed Proposition 8 after telling pollsters they would not: 
(1) many respondents misled pollsters, perhaps worried that they would appear 
bigoted if they expressed their real beliefs; (2) some SSM opponents who initially 
objected to writing discrimination into the constitution changed their minds over 
the year; (3) public support for SSM dropped during the campaign; and (4) survey 
respondents misunderstood the language of Proposition 8 in early polls and more 
accurately stated their positions as they became more aware of its meaning. 
Background
Courts and legislators in California have been more sympathetic than most to 
same-sex relationships (Lewis and Gossett 2008). Although the legislature passed a 
law defining marriage as only between a man and a woman in 1977, and although 
voters affirmed that law at the ballot box in 2000, the legislature created domestic 
partnerships in 1999 and gradually expanded them to provide same-sex domestic 
partners with almost all of the state-sponsored legal benefits of marriage, except 
the word “marriage.” It also passed SSM laws in 2005 and 2007, though Governor 
Schwarzenegger vetoed both (Davies 2007). When some California local govern-
ments issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples in 2004 after the Massachusetts 
supreme judicial court overturned that state’s SSM ban, California’s state supreme 
court invalidated the locally licensed marriages but invited a challenge to the ban 
(Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco 2004). On May 15, 2008, the high 
court ruled the ban unconstitutional and ordered the state to begin issuing marriage 
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licenses to same-sex couples (In re Marriage Cases 2008). By the date of the elec-
tion on Proposition 8, an estimated 18,000 gay and lesbian couples had married.
On the one hand, these actions suggest that California voters were comfortable 
with legally recognizing same-sex relationships. State policy tends to reflect pub-
lic opinion (Page and Shapiro 1983; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Burstein 
2003), perhaps especially when “direct democracy” institutions, like California’s 
initiative process, allow voters to overturn legislative decisions (Gerber 1996; Ha-
gen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2008; Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 2009; Matsusaka 
2001; Monogan, Gray, and Lowery 2009; Arceneaux 2002; Lewis 2011). Several 
studies confirm that state laws on gay rights and SSM reflect public opinion (Lewis 
2003; Lewis and Oh 2008; Lax and Phillips 2009). 
On the other hand, California’s initiative process provides an access point for 
anti-gay rights policy entrepreneurs, giving voters a direct voice in public policy. 
The results have been mixed for gay rights in California. In 1978, voters deci-
sively (58-42) rejected the Briggs Initiative, which would have banned gay men 
and lesbians from teaching in public schools. In 2000, however, voters even more 
decisively (61-39) approved the Knight Initiative, which inserted the words “Only 
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California” into the 
state’s Family Code. As the constitutional challenge to the Knight Initiative moved 
up through the courts, SSM opponents mounted an initiative drive to insert its lan-
guage into the state constitution. This drive gathered the necessary signatures short-
ly after the court’s 2008 decision, even before the first same-sex couples married. 
The Polls and Proposition 8
The history of popular voting on gay rights favored SSM opponents. Accord-
ing to Gamble (1997, 145), “Without the filtering mechanisms of the representative 
system, direct democracy promotes majority tyranny . . . [when] citizens vote on 
civil rights law.” She reports that 79% of anti-gay rights initiatives between 1977 
and 1993 passed. Donovan and Bowler (1998) find less evidence of an anti-gay bias 
in popular votes, especially in larger jurisdictions, but Haider-Markel, Querze, and 
Lindaman (2007) and Lewis (2011) concur with Gamble’s contention. Between 
2004 and 2006, 23 of the 24 states that voted on constitutional bans on SSM passed 
them, usually by overwhelming majorities, and California voted for a legal ban on 
SSM (the Knight Initiative) in 2000.
National and state polls gave little reason to expect California voters would 
support SSM. Several studies indicated strong and fairly stable opposition to SSM 
until very recently—in most polls, 55% to 65% opposed it and only 30% to 35% 
favored it (Rogers 1998; Yang 1997; Brewer and Wilcox 2005). Brewer and Wilcox 
(2005, 600) concluded that “from the early 1990s to the present . . . , there is no sign 
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of a dramatic trend toward greater support.” Lewis and Oh (2008, 45) found “a very 
weak upward trend, and . . . drops in years when the SSM debate was hottest.” Us-
ing data on Californians from national polls, Lewis and Oh (2008) estimated only 
40% support for SSM in 2004, very close to the estimate of Lax and Phillips (2009), 
using different data and methods. Based on state polls of Californians, Lewis and 
Gossett (2008) found support for SSM rising from 30% in 1985 to 43% in 2006, but 
still far short of a majority.2 
Polling on Proposition 8, however, told a different story. Although one early 
poll showed only 36% opposition,3 six statewide polls between May and October 
2008 found Proposition 8 opponents outnumbering supporters (Table 1). Five of 
those polls showed 51% to 54% voting against the proposition and only 38% to 
44% voting for it. In the sixth, only 49% opposed it, but opponents were still five 
points ahead of supporters. On Election Day, however, 52% voted for the ban, well 
beyond the margin of error of the six polls.
One possible explanation for why the polls got Proposition 8 wrong is a gay 
“Bradley effect”4 (Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990). That is, some people who planned 
to vote “Yes” on 8 told pollsters they would vote “No,” perhaps to avoid being seen 
as bigots. ProtectMarriage.com (2008), which led both the initiative effort and the 
“Yes on 8” campaign, released a study during the campaign indicating that polls 
taken before popular votes on SSM had underestimated “support for traditional 
marriage . . . in 23 of the 26 states studied. ” Their campaign manager suggested 
that the reason was that “the media portrays SSM as being politically correct. Sup-
porters of traditional marriage don‘t want pollsters to consider them intolerant, so 
they mask their true feelings on the issue.” 
The argument does not seem convincing, however. Egan (2008) notes that the 
ProtectMarriage.com study treats “don’t know” responses as opposition to “tradi-
tional marriage”; when he splits the “don’t know” respondents appropriately, the 
polls are within a percentage point or two of election results, on average. Herek 
(2008) argues that the study selectively includes several polls conducted many 
weeks or months before the election, neglects some polls that show greater support 
for “traditional marriage,” and ignores the fairly large margins of error of many 
of the polls. Logically, SSM does not seem popular enough to be “politically cor-
rect” among the general public. However, in a reversal of his earlier position, Egan 
(2010) finds that state polls accurately predict opposition to SSM bans but under-
estimate support, consistent with some SSM opponents telling pollsters they were 
undecided or with virtually all undecided voters coming down in favor of the ban. 
A second possible explanation is that some Californians who personally op-
posed SSM may have also opposed writing that ban into the state constitution early 
in the year but changed their minds as the campaign progressed. In an earlier na-
tional debate, the “sanctity” of the U.S. Constitution appears to have been an ef-
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Table 1. Trends in Attitudes toward Same-Sex Partnerships
Attitudes toward Marriage Ballot Initiatives
Yes Unions No DK N Oppose Favor DK N
1985 – June, FieldA 30.1 . 61.8 8.1 1,005 . . . 
1997 – June, FieldA 37.7 . 55.7 6.6 1,045 . . .
1999 – Sept., PPICE . . . . . 32.2 63.6 4.3 2,017
1999 – Dec., PPICE . . . . . 36.9 56.8 6.3 2,037
2000 – Jan., PPICE 38.3 . 61.0 0.7 1,989 34.6 59.0 6.3 2,005
2000 – Feb., PPICE . . . .  36.8 58.2 5.0 2,046
2003 – Mar., FieldA 43.4 . 48.9 7.6 317 . . . .
2004 – Feb., FieldA 44.2 . 49.9 5.9 958 . . . .
2004 – Feb., LATC 31.9 38.3 25.2 4.7 1,936 . . . .
2004 – Feb., PPICA 43.6 . 48.9 7.5 1,990 . . . . 
2004 – Apr., LATC 31.2 39.8 24.5 4.5 1,571 . . . . 
2004 – May, FieldA 39.9 . 54.7 5.4 514 . . . .
2005 – Aug., PPICB 43.6 . 47.5 8.9 1,998 . . . .
2006 – June, FieldD 32.0 32.7 31.0 4.2 500 . . . .
2006 – June, FieldA 43.9 . 49.9 6.3 500 . . . . 
2006 – June, PPICB 43.4 . 47.7 8.9 2,002 . . . .
2007 – June, PPICB 44.3 . 48.1 7.6 2,002 . . . .
2008 – May, LATC,G 34.8 29.8 29.4 6.0 834 36.1 50.9 13.0 834
2008 – May, FieldD,E 45.1 31.5 19.3 4.2 1,052 53.9 39.7 6.5 679
2008 – May, FieldF 41.6 . 50.8 7.7 1,052 50.6 42.5 6.9 381
2008 – July, FieldD,H 45.3 35.1 15.4 4.3 674 51.3 42.4 6.3 680
2008 – Aug., PPICI 44.8 . 48.2 7.1 1,7 53.7 40.1 6.2 1,468
2008 – Sept., FieldJ    . . . . . 52.1 38.4 9.5 853
2008 – Sept., FieldK  . . . . . 54.5 37.8 7.7 816
2008 – Oct., FieldL  . . . . . 49.0 44.2 6.8 976
2008 – Oct., PPICB,I  44.4 . 50.1 5.5 1,992 51.0 44.1 5.0 1,572
2009 – Feb., FieldA,L 44.9 33.6 18.5 3.0 61 48.2 46.6 5.3 767
Marriage Questions:
A Would you approve or disapprove of a law that would permit homosexual people to marry 
members of their own sex and to have the regular marriage laws apply to them? (In 2009, changed 
to: Do you approve or disapprove of California allowing homosexuals to marry members of their 
own sex and have regular marriage laws apply to them?)
B Do you favor or oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to be legally married? 
C Which of the following most closely resembles your own view about state laws regarding the 
relationships of two people of the same sex? “Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally 
marry,” or “Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to form civil unions or domestic partner-
ships, but not legally marry,”  or “There should be no legal recognition of gay or lesbian couple’s 
relationship.”
D In general, which of the following statements comes closer to your view? “Same sex couples 
should be allowed to legally marry,” or “Same sex couples should be allowed to legally form civil 
unions, but not marry,” or “Same sex couples should not be allowed to either marry or form civil 
unions.”                         
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fective argument against the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment. In two 2004 
Los Angeles Times polls, 40% of those who favored civil unions but opposed SSM 
also opposed a federal amendment against SSM. In a 2003 ABC News poll, 55% 
opposed SSM, but 60% of SSM opponents said it was “not worth it” to amend “the 
U.S. Constitution” to make it illegal for homosexual couples to marry. Opponents 
might have thought it was unnecessary to amend the Constitution, or they might 
have thought the issue did not rise to the constitutional level. One famous civil 
union supporter, then-presidential candidate Barack Obama, spoke against writing 
discrimination into the constitution to explain his opposition to Proposition 8: “I am 
not in favor of gay marriage. But when you start playing around with constitutions, 
just to prohibit somebody who cares about another person, it just seems to me that‘s 
not what America‘s about. Usually, our constitutions expand liberties, they don‘t 
contract them” (ABC News 2008).
Constitutional Ban Questions:
E   Proposition 22, the “Limit on marriage” initiative on the March 2000 ballot, adds a provision 
to the family code providing that only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized 
in California. If the election were held today, would you vote yes or no on Proposition 22?
F “Do you favor or oppose changing the California constitution to define marriage as between a 
man and a woman, barring marriage between gay and lesbian couples?”
G “As you may also know, a proposed amendment to the state’s constitution may appear on the 
November ballot, which would reverse the Supreme Court’s decision and reinstate a ban on SSM. 
The amendment would state that marriage is only between a man and a woman. If the November 
election were held today, would you vote for or against the amendment to keep marriage only be-
tween a man and a woman? Well, as of today do you lean more toward voting or for it or lean more 
toward voting against it?”
H “Would you favor or oppose having the state constitution prohibit SSM by defining marriage 
as only between a man and a woman?”
I Proposition 8 is called the “Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to marry Initiative Con-
stitutional Amendment.” It changes the California Constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex 
couples to marry. It provides that only marriage between a man and woman is valid or recognized in 
California. Fiscal impact over the next few years includes potential revenue loss, mainly sales taxes, 
totaling in the several tens of million of dollars, to state and local governments. In the long run, it 
will likely have little fiscal impact on state and local governments.  If the election were held today, 
would you vote yes or no on Proposition 8?
J   Proposition 8 is the Limit on Marriage constitutional amendment. If the election were being 
held today, would you vote YES or NO on Proposition 8? 
K   Proposition 8 is the initiative to Eliminate the Right of Same-S Couples to Marry constitu-
tional amendment.   Would you vote YES or NO on Proposition 8? 
L Suppose in the next statewide general election a constitutional amendment qualified for the 
ballot which asked voters to allow same-sex couples to legally marry in California. If a constitu-
tional amendment like this were on the ballot and the election were being held today, would you 
vote Yes to allow same-sex couples to marry or No to continue to apply marriage laws only to a man 
and a woman?
6
California Journal of Politics and Policy, Vol. 3 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 19
DOI: 10.2202/1944-4370.1130
Brought to you by | Georgia State University
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/27/15 4:06 PM
This argument probably carried less weight with respect to the California con-
stitution, however, which is the world’s third-longest and one that voters regularly 
amend. Although many states that have voted on constitutional amendments al-
ready had laws banning SSM, Californians could only reinstate their SSM ban by 
amending their constitution. Domestic partnerships already provided the state’s gay 
and lesbian couples almost all the state benefits of marriage5 and Proposition 8 
would not affect them. Thus, a “yes” vote on Proposition 8 probably aligned best 
with the policy preferences of those who preferred civil unions as well as those who 
opposed any legal recognition of same-sex relationships. 
A third possibility was that the political campaign may have turned the balance 
against SSM. The combined campaigns for and against Proposition 8 spent more 
than $80 million, making it the second-most expensive election of the year (after 
the presidential race) and probably the most expensive campaign ever on a ballot 
initiative. Public support for gay rights has typically dropped temporarily during 
other gay rights battles. In the midst of the “gays in the military” debate, fewer 
people told pollsters that lesbians and gay men should be able to serve openly in the 
U.S. military than in the years immediately before or after (Yang 1997), and sup-
port for SSM temporarily dropped during both the 1996 debate on DOMA and the 
2004 presidential campaign, when President Bush endorsed the Federal Marriage 
Amendment in light of the first SSMs in Massachusetts (Lewis and Oh 2008). 
Many saw the same pattern with Proposition 8. In a post-mortem of the cam-
paign, Field Poll director Mark DiCamillo (2008, B5) noted that “Double-digit 
leads held by the ‘no’ side in the pre-television advertising stages of the cam-
paign declined precipitously as the TV ad campaigns hit in mid-to-late-September. 
” Many felt that a prize-winning “yes on 8” commercial showing San Francisco 
Mayor Gavin Newsom saying that SSM was “going to happen, whether you like 
it or not” was particularly effective in rousing SSM opponents (Matier and Ross 
2009). Some gay critics of the “no on 8” campaign blamed the electoral loss on its 
failure to respond quickly and effectively to “yes on 8” commercials alleging that 
Proposition 8 would force schools to teach kindergarten children about homosexu-
ality (Weisberg 2008). 
Campaigns should not have much impact on attitudes toward “easy,” salient 
morality policy issues (e.g., Mooney 1999), however, and ideology and religion 
outweigh media exposure and political knowledge in determining opinion on SSM 
(Becker and Scheufele 2009). The general stability of opinion on SM (Brewer and 
Wilcox 2005; Yang 1997; Rogers 1998; Lewis and Oh 2008) argues against rapid 
attitude shifts in response to campaigns. In a study of polling data on 33 ballot 
measures on the legal status of same-sex couples, Egan (2010) concludes that cam-
paigns have had minimal impact on the outcomes.
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The fourth possible explanation is that the campaign may have changed public 
opinion on Proposition 8 rather than on SSM. Perhaps because SSM was legal in 
California, voters may have needed time to learn that one had to vote for Proposi-
tion 8 to vote against SSM. As authors, we repeatedly caught ourselves referring to 
opponents when we meant to say supporters of Proposition 8. Early survey respon-
dents may not have known enough about Proposition 8 to express their preferences 
accurately, and question framing may have encouraged opposition. Because cam-
paigns educate voters (Gelman and King 2009; Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2000), 
respondents may have been clearer in November than in June about the relationship 
between their opinion on SSM and their position on Proposition 8. 
Fleischer (2010, 30) analyzes internal polls conducted for the “no on 8” cam-
paign that first asked whether respondents favored or opposed Proposition 8, then 
followed up with “Just to be clear, is your vote to eliminate marriage for gay or 
lesbian couples in the state of California or NOT to eliminate marriage for gay or 
lesbian couples in the state of California? ” He finds that 11.4% of voters cast votes 
that contradicted their policy preferences, that 16.0% of early voters were “wrong 
way voters,” that the probability of an “incorrect” vote declined as election day 
approached, and that SSM opponents were more likely than supporters to make 
wrong votes. He estimates that if all votes had matched voters’ intentions, Proposi-
tion 8 would have passed 54-46 instead of 52-48.6 Using polling data for 32 states 
that voted on SSM, however, Egan (2010) finds little evidence that polls become 
more accurate as the election approaches or that the amount of underestimation of 
support for bans is related to the political sophistication of the state’s voters.
Data
To test these possible explanations, we obtained individual-level data from 24 
surveys of Californians on SSM. Field Research Corporation conducted 11 of the 
surveys, the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) conducted 10, and the Los 
Angeles Times conducted the other three. In total, 34,000 Californians responded 
to the surveys. Table 1 shows the dates, polling companies, sample sizes, and ques-
tions.
Seventeen of the surveys asked one of four different questions about SSM that 
did not mention ballot initiatives. Two of those questions asked whether respon-
dents favored or opposed marriage for same-sex couples; the other two gave three 
options, allowing respondents to express a preference for civil unions over either 
marriage or no legal recognition. Twelve surveys asked questions about SSM ballot 
initiatives: four PPIC surveys from 1999-2000 asked about the Knight Initiative, 
which amended the state’s Family Code rather than its constitution; seven asked 
five differently worded questions about Proposition 8, with two surveys asking dif-
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ferent questions of split-samples; the 2009 Field Poll reversed the question to ask 
about a proposed initiative to amend the constitution to allow same-sex couples to 
marry.
To test the “Bradley effect” hypothesis, we ask whether responses on SSM, the 
Knight Initiative, and Proposition 8 were more sympathetic to marriage equality in 
the pre-election surveys than were the final votes on those two ballot measures. To 
test whether principled opposition by some SSM opponents to writing discrimina-
tion into the constitution declined over the year, we examine whether support for 
Proposition 8 increased among civil union supporters over the course of the cam-
paign. To assess the impact of the campaign on support for SSM and Proposition 
8, we examine how attitudes toward each issue (SSM and Proposition 8) changed 
over the year. To see whether confusion declined as the election neared, we exam-
ine whether the percentage of respondents who intended to vote “correctly” (i.e., in 
line with their attitudes toward SSM) increased as the campaign progressed. 
Findings
Contrary to the first hypothesis, we find little evidence of a Bradley effect in 
either 2000 or 2008. Averaged across the four 1999 and 2000 polls, 59.4% said 
they favored the Knight Initiative, and an additional 5.5% did not know how they 
planned to vote (Table 1). When we allocate “don’t know” responses proportion-
ately between Favor and Oppose, 63% favored the initiative, consistent with it 
passing by a 61-39 margin. Attitudes toward the Knight Initiative also mirrored 
responses on SSM in the 1997 Field Poll. In contrast, six of seven 2008 polls found 
opponents of Proposition 8 outnumbering supporters by substantial margins, 5 to 7 
percentage points even in the last month of the campaign, over-predicting the “no” 
vote by more than the margin of error. This appears to support a Bradley effect but, 
in polls that both showed Proposition 8 losing and asked a separate SSM question, 
more respondents opposed SSM than favored Proposition 8 (typically by 6 to 8 per-
centage points). If people pretended to oppose Proposition 8 to appear politically 
correct, why would they admit opposing SSM? 
Contrary to the second hypothesis, few voters who opposed SSM took a prin-
cipled stance against writing that ban into the state constitution at any point in the 
campaign. The most likely people to have done so would have been those who op-
posed marriage rights but supported civil unions. Averaging across the three 2008 
polls asking about both civil unions and Proposition 8 (Table 2), however, only 
27% of civil union supporters opposed Proposition 8, barely more than the 22% of 
those who opposed any recognition of same-sex relationships who planned to vote 
against it. As 14% of SSM supporters said they would vote for Proposition 8, a 
9
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Table 2. Attitudes toward Marriage and Proposition 8
Position on Civil   Don’t 
Proposition 8 Yes Unions No Know Total
2008 – May, LATimes 
Favor  20.9 68.8 71.0 36.2 50.9
Don’t know 4.5  18.2 16.3 46.7 13.0 
Oppose 4.5 18.2 12.7 17.1 36.1 
Sample size    290     249 245 50 834
2008 – May, Field
For  14.2 61.2 71.7 28.4 40.7 
Don’t know    2.4 8.0 3.4 57.2 6.6
Oppose  83.4  30.9  24.9 14.3 52.7 
Sample size     474 331 203 44  1,052 
2008 – July, Field
Favor    8.1  68.0  85.4 41.3 42.3 
Don’t know 2.7 7.8 3.7 41.7 6.3 
Oppose  89.2 24.2 11.0 17.1 51.3 
Sample size     304 236 103 29 672
2008 – Aug., PPIC 
Favor  16.2 . 66.2 24.1 40.3
Don’t know 4.1 . 4.3 35.4 6.0 
Oppose  79.7 . 29.5 40.5 53.7
Sample size     719 . 725 89 1,534
2008 – Oct., PPIC 
Favor  14.0 . 74.6 24.3 44.3
Don’t know 3.2 . 2.9 37.6 4.8 
Oppose  82.9  . 22.5  37.9 50.9
Sample size     733 . 788 83  1,604 
2009 – Feb., Field
Amendment to Alow SSM
Oppose 0.6 82.6 94.9 33.9 46.6
Don’t know    1.5 7.3 3.4 50.7 5.3
Favor 97.9 10.1 1.7 15.3 48.2
Sample size     342     256     141       23     761
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stance for which we can find no principled explanation, we conclude that confusion 
is the primary reason. 
The logit model in Table 3 also argues against the second hypothesis. We com-
bine data for the five surveys that asked about both Proposition 8 and SSM and use 
dummy variables to compare three groups (SSM supporters, civil union supporters, 
and those who didn’t know) to those who oppose SSM or any legal recognition (the 
reference group). We include a time trend and its interaction with the three dummy 
variables. The only significant coefficient shows that SSM supporters were far less 
Table 3. Trends in Support for Proposition 8 by Attitude toward SSM
Favors SSM -2.241**
(6.5)
Favors civil unions 0.930
(1.60)
Doesn’t know 0.403
(0.19)
Time trend for SSM opponents 0.208
(0.55)
Difference in time trend for SSM supporters -0.900
(1.61)
Difference in time trend for civil union supporters -1.876
(1.40
Difference in time trend for those who don’t know -1.124
(0.23)
Constant 0.938**
(3.95)
Observations         5,183
Robust z statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 5%
** significant at 1%   
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likely than SSM opponents to plan to vote for Proposition 8. Although neither coef-
ficient is statistically significant, the civil union coefficients are exactly contrary to 
our second hypothesis. They suggest that civil union supporters started out more 
likely than opponents of any legal recognition to favor Proposition 8; as time pro-
gressed, they appeared to become less supportive, while opponents of any legal 
recognition trended very weakly toward greater support for Proposition 8.
Contrary to the third hypothesis, the polls showed no decline in support for 
SSM as the campaign progressed (Table 1). It varied only between 43.4% and 
44.4% in the October 2008, June 2007, and June 2006 PPIC surveys. The February 
2009 Field Poll shows 44.9% choosing marriage on a three-level question, statisti-
cally indistinguishable from the 45.1% and 45.3% in the May and July Field Polls. 
SSM did not receive majority support on any California survey before the election. 
In every 2008 poll, a small majority opposed SSM (on the two-level questions) or 
either preferred civil unions or opposed any legal recognition of same-sex relation-
ships (on the three-level questions).
We found mixed evidence on the fourth hypothesis, that some respondents mis-
understood what it meant to oppose Proposition 8. Most respondents told Field they 
had “seen, read or heard [some]thing about Proposition 8, the state constitutional 
amendment that would place limits on marriages in California,” with the percent-
age rising from 62% in July, to 70% in September, and to 96% in October (data not 
shown in tables). Still, as late as September, 30% of respondents were relying on 
the pollster to explain Proposition 8. This did not prevent them from expressing an 
opinion, however, and most of them got it “right. ” In July, 94% of those who had 
never heard anything about Proposition 8 still indicated how they would vote, with 
84% of those who opposed any legal recognition planning to vote for the proposi-
tion and 89% of those who favored SSM planning to vote against it. Those who said 
they had heard something about Proposition 8 were only 4 or 5 percentage points 
more likely than those who had not to make vote choices consistent with their be-
liefs about SSM. 
The way polling firms framed Proposition 8 questions did not seem to encour-
age respondents to oppose it (Table 1). The Field Poll changed its question repeat-
edly, making it difficult to assess trends, but when it asked different questions on 
split samples (in May and September), responses did not differ significantly on 
the two questions. The PPIC asked a very wordy question that repeated the phrase 
“eliminate(s) the right of same-sex couples to marry” and even mentioned the fiscal 
impact, but responses to it were quite similar to those to the various Field questions, 
and both polling firms found opposition to Proposition 8 falling in September and 
October.
Still, greater knowledge could cause some voters to change their votes to align 
better with their preferences (Table 2). Though most respondents’ positions on 
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Proposition 8 fit with their beliefs about SSM, the number of “errors” is striking: 
across the polls that asked about both, 8% to 21% of SSM supporters said they 
would vote for Proposition 8, and 11% to 25% of opponents planned to vote against 
it. 
Using the five polls that asked about both SSM and Proposition 8, we ran sev-
eral logit models with whether respondents gave “correct” answers on Proposition 
8 (answers that matched their beliefs about SSM) as the dependent variable. We 
restrict the sample to those who favored or opposed same-sex marriage, dropping 
those who chose the civil unions option or said that they didn’t know. We also 
dropped those who did not give a clear response on Proposition 8.
Model 1 simply tests whether the propensity to give right responses rose over 
time. The trend is not significant and has the “wrong” sign, suggesting a drop in the 
probability of giving a right response between May and October (Table 4). Model 
2 tests whether the trend toward correct answers differed between SSM support-
ers and opponents. We add a dummy variable for whether the respondent favored 
SSM plus an interaction between that dummy and the time variable. None of the 
coefficients is individually significant, but both coefficients on the SSM supporter 
variables are positive and they are jointly significant. This provides some evidence 
that SSM supporters were more likely than opponents to choose the position on 
Proposition 8 that matched their preferred policy, consistent with Fleischer’s con-
clusion that the Proposition 8 vote under-stated Californians’ opposition to SSM. 
Models 3 and 4 add a variety of demographic and political variables to test 
whether the confusion explanation makes sense. Two models are necessary because 
the Los Angeles Times survey does not include gender or education. As education 
is a crucial variable, we do not want to drop it, but leaving out an early survey that 
showed the weakest opposition to Proposition 8 could potentially bias our findings. 
Neither model shows a significant trend toward correct responses for SSM oppo-
nents. Model 3 indicates that, holding these other variables constant, SSM support-
ers were more likely than opponents to give correct responses. In Model 4, the two 
supporter coefficients are jointly significant, again suggesting that SSM supporters 
were more likely than opponents to indicate a position on Proposition 8 consistent 
with their beliefs on SSM. 
Consistent with the confusion hypothesis, the probability of a correct response 
rose two percentage points with a year of education.7 Latinos, Asians, and blacks 
were more likely than comparable, equally educated whites to choose the wrong 
response. Because a high percentage of California Latinos and Asians are immi-
grants, this might suggest that less electoral experience leads to greater confusion. 
Arguing against this conclusion, though, is the significant negative coefficient on 
age—older, presumably more electorally experienced voters were more likely to 
choose the wrong position on Proposition 8. Interestingly, party identification had 
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Table 4. Trends in Likelihood of Wrong Responses on Proposition 8 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Time trend   for SSM opponents -0.303 -0.393 0.168 -0.275
(1.00) (1.01) (0.37) (0.66)
Favors SSM 0.188 0.827* 0.390
(0.57) (2.11) (1.08)
Difference in time trend for SSM supporters  0.724 -0.311 0.392
(1.34) (0.50) (0.68)
Education (years)  0.133** 
(6.20) 
Party identification (1-5)    0.133** 0.172**
(3.78) (4.94)
Conservatism (1-5)  0.001 -0.038
(0.01) (0.71)
Age (years) -0.007* -0.009**
(2.27) (2.81)
Male (0,1) 0.147 
(1.47) 
African American  -0.505** -0.520**
(2.68) (2.65)
Latino -0.797** -0.898**
(5.58) (6.82)
Asian American  -0.596** -0.384
(2.77) (1.77)
Other/Mixed 0.303 0.179
(0.89) (0.60)
Born-again or evangelical Christian   0.214 0.133
(1.58) (0.97)
Catholic -0.275* -0.346**
(2.00) (2.61)
Jewish 0.271 0.413
(0.71) (1.15)
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Other religion 0.214 0.250
(1.05) (1.25)
No religious affiliation    0.226 0.222
(1.29) (1.26)
Constant 1.596** 1.352** -0.778 1.645**
(8.54) (5.41) (1.44) (4.07)
Observations 4,361 4,361 3,535 3,927
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%
** significant at 1%  
a strong impact on giving the correct response, with Republicans being 8 percent-
age points more likely than Democrats to choose the Proposition 8 position that 
matched their beliefs about SSM. The Republican Party appears to have communi-
cated its position more effectively than the Democratic Party, or Republican Party 
members may have been more likely to follow the guidance of their leadership.
Although attitudes toward SSM and positions on Proposition 8 did not consis-
tently align better as the election neared, by February 2009, after the election and 
the reaction to it, 98% of marriage supporters said they would vote for a constitu-
tional amendment to allow gay and lesbian couples to marry and 95% of marriage 
opponents said they would vote against it, nearly perfect alignment. 
Conclusion
Why did Californians pass Proposition 8? Although the result shocked many 
SSM supporters, the answer is simple: Proposition 8 passed because a majority of 
California voters still opposed SSM. Why did California’s top pollsters find opposi-
tion to the marriage ban to be stronger than it turned out to be? We find no evidence 
that some respondents falsely gave “politically correct” responses, unless they were 
more embarrassed to say they supported Proposition 8 than that they opposed SSM. 
We find little evidence of SSM opponents not wanting to raise the prohibition to a 
constitutional level: civil union supporters were nearly as likely to favor Proposi-
tion 8 as those who opposed any legal recognition of same-sex relationships (and 
SSM supporters were nearly as likely to favor Proposition 8 as civil union sup-
porters were to oppose it). We find no change in support for SSM itself as a result 
of the campaign: it was as high in October 2008 as throughout the previous three 
years.8 Instead, we find substantial numbers of people telling pollsters they opposed 
Proposition 8 even though they did not favor SSM. We could find little explanation 
for this other than misunderstanding. We tentatively conclude that the $83 million 
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Proposition 8 campaigns increased Californians’ understanding enough that fewer 
voters were taking positions that diverged from their beliefs about marriage by the 
end of the campaign. 
What are the implications for Minnesota? The variety of poll findings already 
suggest that surveys will give only muddy predictions of the outcome, but we find 
little evidence from the California case that survey respondents are unwilling to 
state a “politically incorrect” opinion against SSM or that the campaign for and 
against the amendment will have much impact on support for SSM in the state. If 
Minnesota voters are confused about whether the constitutional amendment will 
create SSM or erect stronger barriers against it (which seems unlikely), the cam-
paign may help clarify their thinking. The California case suggests that the final 
vote will closely reflect Minnesotans’ support for SSM, especially because the 
amendment is on the presidential rather than an off-year ballot and voters will be a 
reasonably representative sample of registered voters. 
Marriage equality supporters might gain from some reluctance to amend the 
Minnesota constitution, as Minnesotans amend it less frequently than Californians 
do theirs. The state already has a law banning SSM, which gives civil union sup-
porters little reason to favor the amendment in the absence of a fear of “activist 
judges. ” On the other hand, support for SSM is probably 7 or 8 percentage points 
lower in Minnesota than in California (Lax and Phillips 2009; Lewis and Oh 2008), 
making defeat of the amendment harder. Recent trends, however, suggest that sup-
port might be rising fast enough that a majority of Minnesota voters will favor 
SSM by Election Day. Gallup finds that support for SSM has increased 13 percent-
age points nationally since 2008 (Newport 2011), the Pew Research Center finds a 
10-point rise since 2001 (Ten Years of Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage 2011), 
and the Public Religion Research Institute sees an 18-point increase since 1999 
(Jones, Cox, and Laser 2011). Our analysis of 12 national polls from 2009 and 2010 
suggests that about 45% of Minnesotans supported SSM during that period,9 48% 
if the “don’t know” responses are allocated between supporters and opponents. If 
Minnesota follows national trends, the state may give marriage equality supporters 
the victory they seek.
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Notes
1 In 2006, Arizona voted down an amendment that also banned civil unions, but it easily passed 
a narrowly worded amendment two years later. (Proposition 107 in 2006 declared, “The State of Ar-
izona and its cities, towns, counties or districts shall not create or recognize a legal status for unmar-
ried persons that is similar to marriage.“ Tucson granted domestic partner status to both same-sex 
and different-sex couples, and concerns about the effects of the initiative on heterosexual couples 
probably led to its 48-52 defeat. Proposition 102 in 2008 merely defined marriage as “only a union 
of one man and one woman“ and passed 56-44.)
2 Lax and Phillips (2009), however, find 15 percentage point increases in support for same-sex 
marriage in a dozen states, including California, from 1995 to 2009. 
3 Recall that “opposition” to Proposition 8 means that one was against amending the constitu-
tion to prohibit same-sex marriage, not against same-sex marriage.
4 Tom Bradley, the black mayor of Los Angeles, lost the 1982 gubernatorial election despite 
leading in the polls in the final weeks of the campaign. Polls also overstated support for black candi-
dates for governor of Virginia in 1989 and for mayor of New York in 1989 and 1993 (Egan 2008) .
5 The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) prevents any federal benefits for same-sex marriages.
6 In the January 2000 PPIC poll, same-sex marriage supporters appeared to be more confused 
than opponents: 24% of the former intended to vote for the Knight Initiative, but only 11% of the 
latter planned to vote against it.
7 In translating the logit coefficients into probability changes, we are holding all other indepen-
dent variables at their means.
8 Fleischer (2010) finds more evidence that the “yes on 8” campaign decreased support for SSM 
in the short term.
9 The polls included 17,600 respondents, including 400 in Minnesota. Running logit analysis 
with support for SSM as the dependent variable, with 11 dummy variables for the surveys and 50 
dummy variables for the states, we found Minnesota ranked 17th in favoring SSM, with support 
about 6 percentage points higher than for the nation as a whole. If a majority of Americans now 
favor SSM, the same should be true for Minnesota. 
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